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UNITED STATES FLOOD CONTROL POLICY: 
THE INCOMPLETE TRANSITION FROM THE 
ILLUSION OF TOTAL PROTECTION TO RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
A. DAN TARLOCK† 
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM PASSIVE TO ACTIVE 
ADAPTATION 
A. The Transition From Passive Adaptation to Maximum Protection 
A flood occurs when water overflows a river or a lake and covers 
land that is not normally submerged. Floods are an inevitable 
function of the hydrologic cycle, and flood cycles were originally seen 
as blessings because they sustained riverine ecosystems and the 
floodplain economies dependent on them. Floods became a social 
problem only when they did not occur. However, as more people 
settled in floodplains, floods transformed into a social problem 
because they both disrupted agricultural production and caused 
extensive damage to settlements. Floodplain dwellers soon expected 
governments to reduce or prevent flood damages through hydrologic 
engineering. The construction of dykes to halt the spread of flood 
waters and increase the current to flush silt downstream dates back to 
at least the eighth century CE in China.1 Roman-raised embankments 
in the Fens lasted until the eighteenth century in England.2 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the story of modern flood 
control was the transition from adaptation to the inevitable to an 
expectation that government would provide maximum flood 
 
 †   A.B. Stanford University, 1962, LL.B. Stanford University, 1965. Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law and Honorary Professor UNESCO Centre for 
Water Law, Policy, and Science, University of Dundee, Scotland. 
 1.  E.g., RANDALL A. DODGEN, CONTROLLING THE DRAGON: CONFUCIAN ENGINEERS 
AND THE YELLOW RIVER IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 14 (2001) (explaining that efforts to 
control flooding on the Yellow River using levees and canals were documented as early as the 
sixth century B.C.E.). 
 2.  JEREMY PURSEGLOVE, TAMING THE FLOOD: A HISTORY AND NATURAL HISTORY OF 
RIVERS AND WETLANDS 40 (1988).  
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prevention and generous post-disaster relief for floodplain dwellers. 
For the last sixty years or so, the story has been the growing 
recognition, especially as the understanding of climate change has 
increased, that the goal of maximum protection is unobtainable 
because flood damage is an inevitable risk that can only be managed, 
but never totally avoided. Thus, we are now making the transition to 
the idea that we must manage floodplains through a combination of 
structural defenses, upstream storage, and land-use controls.3 
This transition to integrated floodplain management will be a 
painful and controversial process because the expectation that we can 
outsmart nature through maximum flood prevention is deeply 
embedded in our thinking about floods. Three powerful and related 
scientific, technological, and ideological nineteenth century 
developments contributed to this expectation. 
First, the science of hydrology developed rapidly in the 
nineteenth century.4 The new understanding of water’s behavior, 
along with the development of new engineering technologies enabling 
construction of large dams, increased the options for flood control. 
Second, these scientific and engineering developments reinforced the 
belief, rooted in ancient Greece,5 that humans should use our 
understanding of nature to improve upon her imperfect processes by 
controlling them when they threaten to impede human activity.6 
 
 3. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PROGRAMME ON FLOOD MGMT., LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED FLOOD MANAGEMENT 11 (2006) (“Given the enormous influence of 
land use on flood risks . . . it is imperative that land use planning and water allocation are 
properly coordinated.”).  
 4.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES 37–
45 (1991) (tracing the development of the science from the Greeks to the present day).  
 5.  See J. DONALD HUGHES, PAN’S TRAVAIL: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE 
ANCIENT GREEKS AND ROMANS 195 (1994) (tracing the evolution of ancient civilization’s 
earlier view of nature as fundamentally sacred to the later secular and self-interested view that 
nature exists to serve human ends and concluding that this approach did not as much lead to 
useful knowledge as it did from the Enlightenment on because natural philosophers merely 
speculated but did not observe and experiment).  
 6.  For a classic example of the belief that we can engineer our way out of natural 
disasters, see Cornella Dean, Lifeline Built on Shifting Sands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at D1, 
which describes the reconstruction efforts of the Highway 12 on the Outer Banks of North 
Carolina. The bridge, rebuilt after Hurricane Irene, is already stressed. Id. North Carolina has 
decided not to follow the example of King Canute. The Danish King of England refused to 
listen to his sycophantic court who claimed that he was all powerful. Along the seashore, he 
asked if he could turn back the tide and demonstrated that he could not by wading into the 
water as it rose around him. See also Jonathon Claybourne, Is Sea Level Rise Dead, WASH. 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.wdnweb.com/2012/02/18/is-sea-level-rise-dead/ 
(describing the 2012 debate surrounding the North Carolina Coastal Commission proposal to 
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Third, a powerful, central state gradually became accepted as the 
entity to control nature, and thus promote human progress.7 
Beginning in the 1860s, these trends led to a policy of maximum 
flood prevention.8 The rub is that the assumptions on which the policy 
is based no longer hold in their original form. However, the United 
States has not found a coherent replacement for maximum flood 
protection. For example, since 2006, the federal government has spent 
$14.5 billion on a post-Katrina flood protection system for New 
Orleans, although the 133-mile chain of levees, flood walls, gates, and 
pumps still puts the city at risk because it is based on the outmoded 
concept of the 100-year flood.9 
B. The Demise of Maximum Protection 
Engineers have long promised floodplain dwellers that structural 
measures such as levees, dykes, and upstream storage reservoirs can 
substantially prevent flood damage. Students of flood policy know 
that promise to be illusory for four basic reasons. First, global climate 
change has undermined many of the fundamental hydrologic 
assumptions upon which flood control, from levee construction to 
reservoir management, is premised. Hydrologists have long assumed 
that they could predict with considerable accuracy the frequency and 
scale of floods.10 Today, the underlying assumption that hydrologic 
regimes are relatively “stationary” over time has been replaced with 
 
add a requirement that county coastal plans include protection for an anticipated 39 inch sea 
rise over the next 100 years, but this bad news was deleted from the current proposed plan after 
protests by county officials fearing a loss of real estate development); H.R. 819, GEN. 
ASSEMBLY (2012) (North Carolina legislation passed in July 2012 forbidding any mention of 
projected sea level rise in any planning document until 2016, a modification of an earlier version 
which contained a permanent prohibition against the inconvenient truth).  
 7.  See, e.g., ROBERT KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND SEA: FLOODS, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND THE SACRAMENTO VALLEY xxi–xxii (1998) [hereinafter KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND 
SEA] (“The decades-long struggle to get control of the Sacramento River illustrates . . . how a 
society originally build almost exclusively around individualism and localism was slowly but 
irresistibly pushed on to construct, out of necessity, strong regulatory central authorities. In this 
sense, Battling the Inland Sea is a study in the history of American federalism.”).  
         8.    See infra notes 33–36. 
 9.  John Schwartz, Vast Defenses Now Shielding New Orleans Against Big Storms, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2012, at A28. 
 10.  See INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE 
CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (1994) (discussing the 
use of projections such as the 100 and 500 year flood, which are used in the design of flood 
control structures).  
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the climate-change-influenced assumption that they are non-
stationary.11 
Second, even before the current efforts to de-legitimate the 
federal government,12 Congress had lost interest in funding large-scale 
water projects,13 which in the eastern United States meant flood-
control reservoirs. The federal government continues to be the major, 
but not exclusive, source of levee maintenance and construction. 
Nevertheless, all indications suggest that the federal government will 
reduce investment in flood control, especially in dams, and instead 
will shift more responsibility for flood management downward to 
equally cash-starved state and local governments.14 
Third, experts (if not politicians) have recognized that not only is 
maximum flood protection an impossible goal; it also has the perverse 
effect of increasing flood damage by encouraging more people to 
occupy floodplains.15 
Fourth, the environmental movement has created more respect 
for the functions and ecosystem services that floods provide. The 
argument is that, to achieve social objectives such as flood control, it 
is often better social policy to work with, not against, natural riverine 
processes.16 
This essay examines the evolution of United States flood policies, 
the laws that have implemented them, and the current debate about 
the merits of these policies and laws. It first examines the relationship 
among major flood disasters, the scientific and engineering debates 
about flood management that the disasters stimulated, and the 
 
 11.  P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCI. 573, 573 
(2008). See generally Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: 
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010) 
(providing five principles for developing environmental law in the face of climate change).  
 12.  See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT 
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS 
OF EXTREMISM (2012) (giving a sobering assessment of the impact of the 2012 Congressional 
election on the operation of the federal government).  
 13.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES FACING 
THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 2–3 (2011).  
 14.  Id. at 17.  
 15.  See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT: VALUE TO THE 
NATION 4 (2009) (noting that total flood prevention is impossible). National flood damages 
averaged around $3.9 billion per year in 1980s and nearly doubled from 1995 to 2004, and total 
disaster assistance for both emergency response operations and subsequent long-term recovery 
efforts increased from an average of $444 million during the 1980s to $3.75 billion during the 
1995-2004 decade. Id.    
 16.  PURSEGLOVE, supra note 2, at 149.  
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policies and legal institutions that emerged post-disaster. It next 
examines the current criticisms of our flood management policies and 
the laws that reflect these policies. It concludes with a discussion of 
the European Union’s 2007 Floods Directive as an example of a 
coherent risk-management policy for floods, and identifies three 
barriers to adopting and implementing such a policy in the United 
States. These are (1) the lack of a coherent flood-management vision, 
(2) the fragmentation of federal spending and its impact on local 
government flood-control programs, and (3) the chilling impact of the 
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. 
II. FIVE BASIC WAYS TO COPE WITH FLOODS 
Flood-protection policy is a product of four factors: a devastating 
flood, the state of flood-mitigation knowledge, available technological 
options, and the political priorities of the time. Flood-protection 
policy has evolved through five overlapping stages: passive 
adaptation, channel control, upstream water retention, floodplain 
management, and integrated flood-risk management. All have been 
attempted, and all are in place around the country. 
A. Passively Adapt to Flood Cycles 
Humans have long accepted floods as inevitable and have 
passively adapted to them. Adaptation is a continuum of strategies 
which range from mere retreat to the use of low-level technologies to 
take advantage of the inevitable flood or to avoid the damages.  
The Nile River in ancient Egypt is the classic example of 
adaptation through using minimal technology to harness the benefits 
of floods. Civilization was only possible in a narrow fertile band along 
the River and depended “on the life-giving waters of the Nile.”17 
Because the River’s annual floods created embankments along the 
river and the valley was convex, it was possible to build an intricate 
system of gravity canals and regulators to distribute the water and 
nutrient-laden silt to irrigate the grains, vegetables, and flax that 
sustained the kingdom.18 
 
 17.  TOBY WILKINSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF ANCIENT EGYPT 29 (2010).  
 18.  ROBERT O. COLLINS, THE NILE 132–33 (2002). The use of technology did not 
accelerate until the late 19th century after the British drove out the last Turkish Pasha in 1882. 
See id. at 141–76. They quickly developed a basin wide flood management program which 
included dams, flood control lakes and diversion canals. See id. 
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Native Americans also dealt with floods by quick adaptation. 
Before the French founded New Orleans, the local hunter–gatherer 
Indian tribes that lived in the region simply retreated to higher 
ground when the Mississippi River flooded.19 However, the United 
States government did not learn from them and has instead tried to 
prevent the maximum amount of flood damage.20 Once a substantial 
human settlement is established, retreat is not an option and societies 
turn to damage-prevention technology. Still, the inevitability of floods 
can be integrated into the expectations of residents. For example, 
consider Davenport, Iowa. The city is built on a narrow floodplain 
and steep hills along the Mississippi and the adjoining bluffs to the 
west. Its neighbor across the river, Moline, Illinois, has levees along 
its banks, but there are none in Davenport. Instead, Davenport deals 
with floods by warnings, by preserving open space adjacent to the 
river, by building temporary dykes, and, of course, by concentrating 
dwellings on the hills.21 
Adaptation can be cheap, but it is always a risky political strategy 
for government. Ancient Egypt’s prosperity and thus political 
stability depended on the annual flood cycle, and her rulers identified 
the relation between the natural order of the Nile and political 
order.22 A low flood year could undermine political stability and, over 
time, create pressures for more sophisticated technological control.23 
A series of low flood years may have speeded Egypt’s fall to the 
Roman Empire during Cleopatra’s reign (52–30 BCE).24 The ensuing 
famine was seen as a sign that the Gods had deserted her, “a 
 
 19. In the 16th century, Spanish explorers of the Mississippi observed that the Indians built 
their houses on high land and, in low areas, built mounds to live on during floods. CHAMP 
CLARK, FLOOD 65–87 (1982); see also LAWRENCE N. POWELL, THE ACCIDENTAL CITY: 
IMPROVISING NEW ORLEANS 7 (2012); Tristram R. Kidder, Making the City Inevitable: Native 
Americans and the Geography of New Orleans, in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS AND ITS 
ENVIRONS: CENTURIES OF CHANGE 9, 11 (Craig E. Colten, ed. 2000). 
 20.  See generally George S. Pabis, Subduing Nature through Engineering: Caleb G. Forshey 
and the Levees-only Policy, 1851-1881, in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS, supra note 19, at 64 
(detailing the development of a total flood control policy during the middle of the nineteenth 
century).  
 21.  See DAVENPORT, IOWA, CODE § 15.44 (2000) (restricting development within the 
Mississippi River and tributary creek floodplains and requiring the elevation of residential 
structures and the flood proofing of commercial buildings located in the floodplain areas).  
 22.  WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 27–30. 
 23.  COLLINS, supra note 18, at 18, 130.  
 24. See WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 496; cf. DODGEN, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that 
Classical Chinese history attributed the fall of a dynasty with the loss of the mandate of heaven, 
a major symptom of which was “the inability to control the Yellow River”).   
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profoundly worrying development.”25 The lessons were repeated in 
China, where flood control was central to the emperor’s legitimacy.26 
In the United States, the failure of the federal government to prevent 
and ameliorate the negative consequences of the disastrous 1927 
Mississippi Delta Flood pried African-Americans away from the 
Republican Party of Lincoln and helped to create the New Deal 
coalition that sustained the Democratic Party from 1932 to 1952.27 
B. Confine the River to Its Bed and Manipulate It 
Permanent human settlement precludes retreat as a strategy, and 
therefore produces demand for levee construction and channel 
alteration. Levees are the oldest type of human intervention with 
hydrologic regimes.28 Soon after its founding in 1717, New Orleans 
built its first levee.29 Long before New Orleans, the Chinese realized 
that they needed to control upstream flood dynamics because silt-
laden runoff raised riverbeds and increased the spread of 
floodwaters.30 In the United States, farmers in the Sacramento Valley 
linked the severity of floods in part to the flushing of hydraulic mining 
waste into Sacramento’s tributaries, which raised the riverbed and 
caused frequent winter floods.31 
Levees and channel alteration emerged as the flood-protection 
strategy of choice after the Civil War, when Congress assigned to the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers lead responsibility for 
protecting land along the Mississippi River (alongside its primary 
mission of navigation enhancement).32 Rival engineers advocated 
competing theories of how to control flooding by moving water as 
 
 25.  WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 496.  
 26.  DODGEN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 27.  See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND 
HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 412–15 (1997) (discussing the social, cultural, and economic  
impact of the Mississippi flood of 1927 on the African-American community).  
 28.  Larry W. Mays, Irrigation Systems, Ancient, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA: SCI. & ISSUES, 
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Hy-La/Irrigation-Systems-Ancient.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2012).  
 29.  Christopher Morris, Impenetrable but Easy: The French Transformation of the Lower 
Mississippi Valley and the Founding of New Orleans, in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS, supra 
note 19, at 22, 34; see also POWELL, supra note 19.  
 30.  DODGEN, supra note 1, at 13.  
 31.  ROBERT KELLEY, GOLD VS. GRAIN: THE HYDRAULIC MINING CONTROVERSY IN 
CALIFORNIA’S SACRAMENTO VALLEY 57 (1959).  
 32.  Christine A. Klien & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a 
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1478–80 (2007). 
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quickly as possible into the Gulf of Mexico.33 Andrew Humphreys, 
Chief Engineer of the Corps, argued that levees alone were the best 
strategy because they would accelerate the current and deepen the 
river channel.34 Humphreys’s rival, the brilliant engineer James Eads, 
convinced the Corps that the same result could be more effectively 
achieved by constructing jetties at the mouth of the River.35  
Political ideology also impeded flood-control policy. The Corps 
did construct some navigation-improvement levees along the 
Mississippi and other large rivers. However, in the nineteenth 
century, Jeffersonian ideology ensured that flood control was a local, 
or at best, a state function,36 even though rivers such as the Mississippi 
spanned many states.37 Today, the United States still has no unified 
levee system; there are over 100,000 miles of levees in various states 
of repair and deterioration in the United States, and eighty-five 
percent are locally owned.38 
The levees-only policy could not prevent flood damage in part 
because coverage was fragmented.39 The Mississippi River 
Commission tried to coordinate levee construction through its 
standard-setting policy, but the weaknesses of that approach became 
increasingly apparent over time.40 Congress took a first step toward 
federal responsibility for flood prevention by passing the Flood 
Control Act of 1917.41 The Act authorized levee construction, but 
only on the condition that the levees would be turned over to local 
interests for maintenance.42 It took the 1927 Mississippi River Flood 
to fundamentally change United States policy. 
 
 33.  See Richard G. Weingardt, James Buchanan Eads, 5 LEADERSHIP & MGMT. 
ENGINEERING 70, 73 (2005).  
 34.  Klien & Zellmer, supra note 32, at 1479.  
 35.  Weingardt, supra note 33, at  73–74.  
 36.  See, e.g., KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND SEA, supra note 7, at 31–32 (telling the story 
of the increasing centralization and scale of flood control in California’s Sacramento River 
Valley).  
 37.  The Mississippi River Commission was formed in 1879 and adopted a policy of 
coordinated levee construction in 1882. MISS. RIVER COMM’N, THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER & 
TRIBUTARIES PROJECT: HISTORY OF LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER LEVEE SYSTEM 5–6 (2007).  
 38. Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, Levees, REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE, 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/fact-sheet/levees (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).  
 39. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 32, at 1482–83. 
 40. See U.S. WATER RES. POLICY COMM’N. WATER RESOURCES LAW 128–29 (1950).  
 41.  Flood Control Act of 1917, ch. 144, 39 Stat. 948 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
701–703 (2006)).  
 42.  Id. § 1(d).   
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Students of environmental law have demonstrated how major 
disasters, such as floods or persistent air pollution, have contributed 
to the development of new public-policy responses and laws.43 Among 
other events in the late 1920s, the 1927 Mississippi Flood illustrates 
this thesis. In brief, extraordinarily heavy rains in the Missouri-
Mississippi valleys from August 1926 to April 1927 caused levee 
failures from Missouri to Louisiana in April 1927.44 “The 1927 Great 
Mississippi Flood inundated 27,000 square miles (70,000 square 
kilometers) of land with as much as 30 feet (9 meters) of water. It 
took until mid-August for all of the water to recede, leaving a mud-
covered, barren landscape.”45 
Congress responded to the 1927 flood by enacting the Flood 
Control Act of 1928,46 which had five major consequences for United 
States flood control policy that continue to the present. First, the 1928 
Act cemented federal responsibility for flood control by making it a 
Corps mission of equal if not greater importance than navigation.47 
 
 43. See, e.g., JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION & POLICY: A CASE ESSAY 
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940–
1975, at 263–77 (1977) (using the history of the Los Angeles pollution crises to explain the role 
episodic crises play in policymaking).  
 44.  BARRY, supra note 27, at 194–201.  
 45.  RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, THE 1927 GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD: 80-YEAR 
RETROSPECTIVE 7 (2007), available at http://www.rms.com/publications/1927_ 
MississippiFlood.pdf. The social impacts of the flood were as important as the physical ones. 
African-Americans were forced to reinforce levees—many of the breaches flooded lands on 
which they lived—and neither the federal nor state governments provided significant relief. 
BARRY, supra note 27, at 314–17, 371. The inadequate federal response triggered the Great 
Migration north, and pried African-Americans from the Republican Party, see id. at 414–16. 
 46. Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
702a–702m, 704 (2006)). Section 2 of the Act stated the following:  
[I]n view of the extent of national concern in the control of these floods in the 
interests of national prosperity, the flow of interstate commerce, and the 
movement of the United States mails; and, in view of the gigantic scale of the 
project, involving flood waters of a volume and flowing from a drainage area 
largely outside the States most affected, and far exceeding those of any other 
river in the United States, no local contribution to the project herein adopted 
is required.  
Id. § 2. However, Congress did not expressly endorse federal responsibility for flood control 
nationwide until 1936. Klein & Zellmer, supra note 32, at 1485; see also infra notes 61–64 and 
accompanying text.  
 47.  See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1928 § 1 (placing the flood control project under the 
supervision of the Army Corp of Engineers). The 1928 Act was an immediate response to the 
flood and forced the Corps to recant its longstanding opposition to the Progressive 
Conservation idea of basin-wide multiple purpose water projects. Klein & Zellmer, supra note 
32, at 1484–85. The Act itself continued the levees-only policy but took a major step toward 
federal responsibility for comprehensive river-basin management by authorizing $325 million to 
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Second, the 1928 Act laid the foundation for the demise of the levees-
only approach, with a transition to the construction of upstream 
reservoirs. Third, the 1928 Act formally committed the Corps to the 
Progressive Conservation Era vision of a river-basin-wide approach 
to water management.48 For the first time, the Corps was directed to 
include “the establishment of a reservoir system” in its basin-wide 
planning for the Mississippi.49 Fourth, the 1928 Act enshrined as the 
dominant flood-management paradigm structural defense through 
dams and levees, supplemented by dedicated flood ways.50 Fifth, the 
1928 Act’s commitment to structural defense created the seeds of its 
partial demise as flood damages continued to rise, eventually 
triggering the debate between the merits of taming, as opposed to 
working with, nature. This debate currently dominates flood control 
policy.  
C. Retain Flood Waters in Large Reservoirs 
Levees remain a popular flood-control strategy. Their physical 
bulk gives the impression that building behind them is safe. But this is 
an illusion. Levees fail in various ways.51 To complement this strategy, 
flood-control policymakers pursued the dream of maximum damage 
 
construct levees and outlets on land subject to flood easements. See Flood Control Act of 1928 § 
1.  
 48. See Flood Control Act of 1928 § 1 (authorizing “the project for the flood control of the 
Mississippi River in its alluvial valley”); see also ARTHUR E. MORGAN, DAMS AND OTHER 
DISASTERS: A CENTURY OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS 300–02 (1971) 
(criticizing the Corps, the author’s long time antagonist).   
 49.  33 U.S.C. § 702j (2006). The roots of the legislation go back to a 1925 act, Act of Mar. 
3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1186 (1925), which mandated joint Federal Power Commission and Corps 
studies of the feasibility of power development on navigable streams. The resulting 308 studies, 
H.R. Doc. No. 69-308 (1927), laid the foundation for the subsequent expansion of Corps 
planning responsibility and mission expansion. For Corps planning mandates from 1925 to 1944, 
see U.S. WATER RES. POLICY COMM’N, supra note 40, at 408–17. 
 50.  33 U.S.C. § 702c (reinforcing the maximum structural protection strategy by 
immunizing the federal government from any liability for “damage from floods or flood waters 
at any place”). But see Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 436–437 (2001) (creating 
an exception for non-flood waters running in a federal flood control project); In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 446–48 (5th Cir. 2012) (refusing to apply 
§ 702c’s immunity to the negligent construction of a navigation channel, the Missisippi River 
Gulf Outlet, that carried the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina into New Orleans, although 
ultimately finding immunity under the discretionary-function exception of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act).   
 51.  See Evan Lehmann & ClimateWire, When the Levee Breaks: U.S. Flood Protection 
Inadequate, SCI. AM. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=us-flood-
protection-inadequate-levee-breaks.  
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elimination through dams and reservoirs throughout most of the 
twentieth century. Flood-control dams date from the third or second 
millennium BCE,52 but they did not come into widespread use until 
the nineteenth century in Europe. 
In the United States, the modern flood-control dam is the legacy 
of Arthur Morgan, the visionary engineer widely credited as the first 
proponent of a strategy of water-retention. In response to a disastrous 
1913 flood in Dayton, Ohio,53 Morgan convinced the city to build 
upstream flood-control storage reservoirs on the Miami River.54 His 
solution for the Miami Conservacy District became the template for 
federal policy when it was adopted by the United States Congress in 
the 1928 Act.55 The Miami model launched Morgan’s career; from 
1933 to 1938, he was the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
and the dams and reservoirs that are part of the Lower Mississippi 
flood-control system are his most concrete legacy.56 
Into the 1920s, the Corps was still under the spell of its levees-
only policy and opposed dams even as its new rival, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, was building multiple-purpose dams, primarily for 
irrigation and hydroelectric power production.57 But Congress 
dragged the Corps into dam building. Starting in 1925, Congress 
required that the Federal Power Commission and the Corps prepare 
river-basin plans for the “improvement” of streams for navigation, 
 
 52.  See ROBERT B. JANSEN, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
DAMS AND PUBLIC SAFETY 1–2 (1983), available at http://ussdams.com/ussdeducation/ 
Media/damsfrombegin.doc (discussing the early history of dams, especially dam projects on the 
Nile River).  
 53.  The flood is well documented. For a list of links to information about the flood and to 
personal accounts, see The Great Dayton Flood of 1913, DAYTON HISTORY BOOKS ONLINE, 
http://www.daytonhistorybooks.com/page/page/1566099.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
 54.  J. David Rodgers, The 1913 Dayton Flood and the Birth of Modern Flood Control 
Engineering in the United States (unpublished PowerPoint presentation), available at 
http://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/umrcourses/ge301/Dayton%20Flood-Updated.pdf.  
 55.  See 33 U.S.C. § 702j. It is difficult to trace Morgan’s influence directly. He claimed 
paternity for Corps of Engineers flood control dams. MORGAN, supra note 48, at 302; LELAND 
R. JOHNSON, THE FALLS CITY ENGINEERS: A HISTORY OF THE LOUISVILLE DISTRICT, CORPS 
OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY 195–96 (1974), available at 
http://publications.usace.army.mil/publications/misc/un22/c-12.pdf, provides more objective 
evidence that Corps engineers who studied the Miami Valley dams incorporated the success of 
dams into their thinking, which in turn influenced Congress.  
 56.  MORGAN, supra note 48, at 344.  
 57.  See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890–1920, at 208–11 (1959) (explaining the 
hostilities of the Corps towards dam construction).  
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hydroelectric power, irrigation, and flood control.58 These “308 
Reports,” named after the document number for the first report, were 
submitted to Congress in 1926,59 and the 1928 Act required that a 308 
Report for the Mississippi be prepared that included, inter alia, a 
determination of whether additional flood control could be “attained 
through the control of flood waters in the drainage basins of the 
tributaries by the establishment of a reservoir system.”60 
The floodwater-retention strategy was enshrined in United 
States law and policy during the Great Depression and the aftermath 
of World War II. During his four terms, President Franklin Roosevelt 
first embraced dams as engines of employment to combat 
skyrocketing joblessness during the Depression, and after the Allied 
victory became certain, saw them as sources of employment for 
returning veterans.61 Congress agreed and enacted two New Deal 
Congressional acts committing the United States to multiple-purpose 
dams where flood control was a primary purpose. The Flood Control 
Act of 193662 declared that flood control on navigable rivers and their 
tributaries was a “proper activity of the Federal Government in 
cooperation with States, their political subdivisions and localities.”63 
In an attempt to rationalize federal spending, it also introduced 
benefit–cost analysis as the standard for project construction.64 
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), created under the 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, was the first to put 
floodwater retention into large-scale practice. During World War II, 
an effort was made to apply the lessons of the TVA to the Missouri 
 
 58.  Act of Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 467, § 3, 43 Stat. 1186, 1190.  
 59.  See H.R. Doc. No. 69-308 (1926).  
 60.  33 U.S.C. § 702j.  
 61.  JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
THE PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM 2–3 (1993) (quoting the statement of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, to the  National Reclamation Association 
in 1943 “that the Bureau of Reclamation was prepared to neutralize demobilization’s negative 
effect on the West”).  
 62.  Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1572.  
      63.   Id. 
 64.  United States v. W. Va. Power Co., 122 F.2d 733, 736–37 (4th Cir. 1941). Although the 
Corps and the Office of Management and Budget are committed to formal benefit-cost analysis, 
Congress is not bound by good practice and has unlimited discretion to decide whether a project 
it chooses to approve meets the statutory standard. 
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River.65 By the 1940s, the rural population of the Missouri River 
watershed was declining.66 Urban areas were growing, and Omaha 
and other upstream cities experienced serious flooding in 1943.67 
These floods led to pressure for a quick, federal, and structural 
solution.68 Within a short time, the Missouri River Division Corps 
Engineer, General Lewis A. Pick, proposed a flood-control plan that 
relied on the construction of five mainstream reservoirs on the 
Missouri from North Dakota to the northeastern border of 
Nebraska.69 William Sloan, of the Bureau of Reclamation, prepared a 
competing plan that was more favorable to upstream irrigation 
interests. Congress combined the plans, and funded the new Pick–
Sloan Plan in 1944.70 The five authorized dams were completed by the 
early 1960s.71 Other flood-control dams followed in the 1950s and 
1960s.72 Nationwide, the Corps currently owns over 600 flood-control 
dams on both large and small rivers.73 
Ironically, these two New Deal programs made it impossible for 
the federal government to manage river basins, contributing to the 
fragmentation that characterizes current United States water-
management policy. President Roosevelt hoped to first apply the 
TVA regional-authority model to the Missouri and then to the world, 
but the Basin states and Congress blocked any efforts to “TVA-ize” 
 
 65.  See DAVID P. BILLINGTON, DONALD C. JACKSON & MARTIN V. MELOSI, THE 
HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS: PLANNING, DESIGN, AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE ERA 
OF BIG DAMS 269–99 (2005). 
 66.  FERRELL, supra note 61, at 2. 
 67.  Id. at 8. 
 68.  Historic Floods on the Missouri River, NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
http://www.dnr.ne.gov/floodplain/mitigation/mofloods.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 69.  FERRELL, supra note 61, at 50–51. An earlier dam, Fort Peck, was constructed in the 
1930s by the Works Progress Administration and was incorporated into the Pick-Sloan Plan in 
1944. Id. 
 70.  See id. at 39–68 (providing a history of the quick of resolution of the two plans, one 
focused on irrigation, and the other on flood control). 
 71.  BILLINGTON ET AL., supra note 65, at 288. The dams have prevented considerable 
downstream flooding, but flooding on the Missouri and Mississippi continues. See infra notes 
87–88. The controversies surrounding the allocation and management of the Missouri are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 72.  For example, thirty-seven flood control dams were built in West Virginia between 1938 
and 1988. Flood Control, W. VA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/2196 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 73.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  supra note 13, at 8. 
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the Missouri in the 1944 legislation.74 Administrative support for a 
Missouri Basin Authority died with President Roosevelt in 1944. 
The dream of comprehensive, federal river-basin development 
lived on until the 1970s. After the New Deal, federal support for large 
dam construction continued but only on a project-by-project basis.75 
The Eisenhower Administration (1952–1960) followed a “no-new 
starts” water-resources-development policy, and stressed increased 
local responsibility for smaller projects.76 This policy was reversed in 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1960–1968); new Corps 
dams were built in the 1960s in the Southeast and Midwest.77 
President Johnson was a committed dam builder,78 and he tried to 
revive New Deal-style river-basin planning. The Water Resources 
Planning Act of 196579 created seven river-basin commissions 
coordinated by a federal Water Resources Council. 
The attempted revival was too late. Congress was funding fewer 
dams, levees, and canals, leaving these commissions with no clearly-
defined role.80 Water planning had historically meant water-project 
planning, and it was impossible to adjust this model to basin 
management.81 The National Water Commission, which operated 
between 1968 and 1973, identified many of the problems of trying to 
adapt a construction model to the changing water demands with 
which the Corps was struggling.82 The Commission accurately noted 
that “[t]he Corps . . . is not likely to exist as any agency specializing in 
the construction of great engineering works; it seems virtually certain 
that in the future the United States will need relatively few major 
 
 74.  FERRELL, supra note 61, at 74–86. 
 75.  STEVEN SOLOMON, WATER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE FOR WEALTH, POWER, AND 
CIVILIZATION 343 (2010). 
 76.  MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING 
WATER 280 (1986). 
 77.  Id. at 283.                                   
 78.  ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER (1990). 
 79.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 to 1962d-3 (2006). 
 80.  See SOLOMON, supra note 75, at 249 (“America’s age of great dams drew to a close 
during the 1970s. By then, virtually all the best large dam sites had been exploited.”). For the 
best account of President Jimmy Carter’s role in bringing the Big Dam Era to a close, see 
REISNER,  supra note 76. 
 81.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER 
RESOURCES PLANNING: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR SERVICE 36–41 (2004) (tracing the 
evolution of water resources planning from project to environmental restoration and risk-based 
planning). 
 82.  NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 366 (1973).  
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navigation, flood control, or water projects.”83 The Commission was 
especially critical of the lack of focus and coordination in federal 
water-resources planning, which could be essentially characterized as 
planning for planning’s sake.84 
 
D. Manage Floodplains 
Dams and levees do prevent significant flood damage, but suffer 
from two major limitations. First, flood damage can never be totally 
prevented; it can only be minimized. The Mississippi River illustrates 
this first problem: its middle and lower sections “are not impounded 
by any main-channel dams.”85 These dams are insufficient to prevent 
flood events, especially in the Upper Basin, such as those that 
occurred in 199386 and 2011.87 Similar examples can be found all over 
the country.88 
 
 83.  Id. at 412. 
 84.  Id. Congress does sometimes mandate a basin-wide approach. For example, in an 
omnibus act passed in 2009, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to assess specific 
risks to the water supply of each major reclamation river basin, analyze the extent to which 
changes in the water supply of the United States will impact meeting the needs of the basin 
resources, and consider and develop appropriate strategies to mitigate each impact of water 
supply changes. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 9501–
08, 123 Stat. 991, 1329–46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10361–68 (Supp. III 2009)). 
“Major reclamation river basins” are defined to include the Columbia, Colorado, Missouri, and 
Sacramento/San Joaquin river basins. Id. § 9502(12)(B), 123 Stat. at 1331.  
 85.  JASON S. ALEXANDER, RICHARC C. WILSON & W. REED GREEN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF RIVER ENGINEERING AND 
DAMS ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER SYSTEM AND DELTA 11 (2012), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1375/C1375.pdf. “However, all of [the middle and lower sections] major 
tributaries have impoundments.” Id. 
 86.  See generally THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1993: CAUSES, IMPACTS, AND RESPONSES 
(Stanley A. Changnon ed., 1996) (describing a major flood that occurred in 1993 on the Upper 
Mississippi River and Missouri River Basins); Woltemade, supra note 85 (stating the 1993 flood 
caused $12 billion in damages). 
 87.  See 2011 Mississippi River Floods, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
2011_Mississippi_River_floods (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (describing major flooding on the 
Mississippi River in 2011). 
 88.  See, e.g., Flood Control, supra note 72 (“Despite flood-control efforts, West Virginia 
remains prone to damaging floods. A flood on April 5, 1977, along the Tug Fork of the Big 
Sandy River saw 11 counties declared major disaster areas. In November 1985, record flooding 
in central and eastern West Virginia, especially in the headstream areas of the Greenbrier, 
Potomac, Monongahela and Little Kanawha rivers, resulted in 47 deaths and hundreds of 
millions of dollars in property damage. Occasionally, floods strike even in watersheds protected 
by dams, as was the case in the Little Kanawha Valley downstream of the Burnsville Dam in 
1985 and 1994.”). 
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Second, structural solutions have perverse effects: floodplain 
protection encourages settlement, so that when a flood occurs, the 
damage often exceeds that which would have been expected prior to 
dam construction. This is a classic moral-hazard problem. Moral 
hazard refers to socially undesirable, often inefficient, behavior that is 
encouraged by the expectation that there will not be punishment; 
rather, there may often be rewards.89 The concept originated with 
insurance-company efforts, such as deductibles, designed to induce 
beneficiaries to refrain from activities that would trigger liability 
under a policy.90 
Today, the need to adjust to the inevitability of floods is accepted 
by all students of flood policy and is partially reflected in federal 
flood-control law and policy.91 But the structural-defense paradigm 
remains firmly entrenched because of the strong expectations of 
safety and security it has engendered. Thus, adjustment is often 
fiercely resisted because it means limiting floodplain development 
and shifting responsibility to individual landowners to take avoidance 
actions.92 The rise of the adjustment or floodplain-management 
paradigm is the legacy of the late geographer Gilbert White, one of 
the great students of water and disaster policy in the twentieth 
century. White’s seminal 1942 University of Chicago thesis, Human 
Adjustment to Floods,93 remains the bible of modern flood-control 
thinking. “Few publications can claim to have transcended the 
original field in which they were written, by shaping a wide range of 
research areas and philosophies.”94 White pioneered the argument 
that structural flood defense creates a classic moral-hazard problem 
because government’s expectation that dams and levees would 
protect floodplains leads them to encourage floodplain 
development.95 When the inevitable flood comes, property losses and 
 
 89.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 136–37 (8th ed. 2011). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., THE ROLE OF LAND-USE PLANNING IN FLOOD 
MANAGEMENT: A TOOL FOR INTEGRATED FLOOD MANAGEMENT 22 (2007). 
 92.  In flood control management, “one of the key considerations would be how much land 
is required to pursue a local development agenda and how much of it is located in hazardous 
areas. This usually limits the choices considerably.” Id. 
 93.  GILBERT FOWLER WHITE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS: A GEOGRAPHICAL 
APPROACH TO THE FLOOD PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1945).  
 94.  N. Macdonald et al., The Significance of Gilbert White’s 1945 Paper “Human 
Adjustment to Floods” in the Development of Risk and Hazard Management, 36 PROGRESS 
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 125, 125 (2012).  
 95.  See id. at 127.  
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other damage increase—the opposite outcome of the justification for 
structural defense. 
White’s thinking is now the conventional wisdom when 
examining flood-protection initiatives. For example, in criticizing the 
California Central Valley Flood Protection Plan—California’s 
ambitious attempt to address flooding at a large geographic scale—
two academics argued that the failure of the plan to impose limits on 
growth was a classic example of the problems White identified: 
Increasing protection levels actually increases risk where it induces 
urbanization and increases the valuable life and property exposed 
in areas that would otherwise remain undeveloped. That levees 
induce urban development where it was formerly discouraged by 
nuisance flooding is well documented. The effect is accepted by 
scientists and policy analysts, going back to the pioneering work of 
Gilbert White (1945) . . . .96 
 Adjustment is not just an academic theory. White’s thinking 
formed the basis of the 1968 National Flood Insurance Program.97 The 
federal government became involved in flood insurance because 
private insurance policies do not cover flood (as opposed to wind) 
damage.98 Efforts to provide federal insurance date back to 1956, but 
accelerated when Lyndon Johnson’s Administration created task 
forces to recommend a national flood-insurance program.99 The 
ensuing legislation reflected an appreciation of White’s moral-hazard 
analysis, but did not fully implement it. The Bureau of the Budget’s 
task force recommended that Congress first enact an experimental 
program to evaluate its effectiveness at actually preventing damage.100 
However, in the last burst of faith in government before the Vietnam 
 
 96.  Letter from G. Mathias Kondolf, Professor & Chair, Dep’t of Landscape Architecture 
& Envtl. Planning, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, & Jessica Ludy, Fulbright Fellow, Delft Univ. of 
Tech., Neth., to Cent. Valley Flood Prot. Bd. (Apr. 20, 2012), available at 
http://thewateraway.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/a-closer-look-at-the-cvfpp-1-does-increasing-
protection-increase-risk/. See generally Central Valley Flood Protection Plan, CENT. VALLEY 
FLOOD PROT. BD., http://www.cvfpb.ca.gov/CVFPP/ (last modified Aug. 29, 2012) (providing 
information on the plan as approved in 2012).  
 97.  Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FEMA Leaders’ Statements on the 
Passing of Gilbert F. White (Oct. 6, 2006), available at  http://www.fema.gov/news-release/fema-
leaders-statements-passing-gilbert-f-white; see A Chronology of Major Events Effecting the 
Federal Flood Insurance Program, NAT’L INST. FOR RESEARCH, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/ 
blaw/FEMA/nfip_eval_chronology.pdf. 
 98.  Facts About Flood Insurance, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/disaster_ops/flood_fs.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).  
 99.  See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 89-465 (1966) (evaluating the benefits of a national flood 
protection plan). 
 100.  Id. at 39. 
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War, Watergate, and the rise of the right, Congress enacted a national 
insurance program. 
The core elements of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968101 
are the mapping of 100-year floods, the adoption of local flood-
management programs that limit construction in 100-year floodplains, 
and the requirement that landowners in the hazard areas purchase 
flood insurance to qualify for a loan.102 The program provides 
subsidized rates for buildings constructed before 1974, the year Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) were prepared.103 Post-FIRM 
buildings must pay full actuarial rates.104 
The federal flood-insurance program was flawed from the start, 
and its problems have progressively worsened. In combination with 
the construction of flood-control projects, a federal flood-insurance 
program encourages over-building in high-risk areas.105 Writing on the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the program, Gilbert White and the 
equally distinguished disaster-risk expert Howard C. Kunreuther 
noted that flood damages continued to increase due to several factors. 
First, although nine to eleven million people lived in floodplains, only 
2.5 million insurance policies were in force.106 This coverage gap 
occurred both because many real-estate agents failed to disclose when 
structures were located in a floodplain, and because banks were lax in 
enforcing the mandatory insurance requirement for mortgages.107 
Second, a large number of grandfathered structures suffered repeated 
losses but were not relocated.108 Third, in the past decade, the federal 
flood-insurance program has been on life support, living on 
temporary extensions that have allowed politicians to avoid hard 
 
 101.  National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4127 (2006)). 
 102.  42 U.S.C. § 4012(a) (2006). 
 103.  Id. § 4015(b). 
 104.  Id. § 4015(c).  
 105.  See Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National Flood Insurance 
Program, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2010, at 165, 179 (“Many residents living in hazard-prone areas 
not only lack interest in purchasing natural hazard insurance and keeping it, they also rarely 
undertake voluntary loss prevention measures to protect their property.”);  see also Valdis Wish, 
Can Insurers Cope with Climate Change?, ALLIANZ (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://www.knowledge.allianz.com/search.cfm?98/can-insurers-cope-with-climate-change. 
 106.  Howard C. Kunreuther & Gilbert F, White, The Role of the National Flood Insurance 
Program in Reducing Losses and Promoting Wise Use of Floodplains, WATER RESOURCES 
UPDATE, Spring 1994, at 31, 32.  
 107.  Id. at 32–33. 
 108.  Id. at 32. 
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reform questions. The costs of the 2005 hurricane season, which were 
primarily due to Hurricane Katrina, added eighteen billion dollars of 
debt to the program, even though it was already running in the red.109 
In July 2012, Congress responded to a strong push by the real-estate 
industry and extended the program.110 The National Flood Insurance 
Extension Act basically leaves the program intact, with minor 
improvements, but does raise the cap on premium increases for 
secondary and vacation homes from ten percent to twenty-five 
percent.111 
The 1968 Act pressures cities to develop flood-control plans with 
a mix of structural and non-structural solutions to further stretch the 
available local, state, and federal money. Cedar Rapids, Iowa is an 
example of this strategy. In 2008, the city suffered six billion dollars in 
damages when the Cedar River overflowed its banks.112 The city 
responded by creating a flood-management plan to increase the span 
of floodwalls around the downtown area, but also to develop a 
greenway across the river to spread the flood waters.113 The plan 
raises a classic environmental-justice issue since lower-income 
residences are often built in unprotected floodplains. Nonetheless, it 
is an example both of Gilbert White at work and of state-of-the-art 
river management. 
E.  Adopt Integrated Risk-Based Floodplain Management 
Since 1908, the floodplain-management community has fully 
embraced the idea that flood damages can at best be minimized, but 
 
 109. Flood Insurance Reform Priorities Act of 2010, H.R. 495, 111th Cong., 22 (2010), 
reported that the program’s debt stood at $18.75 billion primarily because of 2005 hurricane 
claims.  See generally WILL HEYES & ANDREW FAHLUND, AM. RIVERS, WEATHERING THE 
CHANGE: POLICY REFORMS THAT SAVE MONEY AND MAKE COMMUNITIES SAFER 5 (2011), 
available at http://www.americanrivers.org/assets/pdfs/global-warming-docs/weathering-change/ 
weathering-change-full-report.pdf.   
 110.  See National Flood Insurance Program Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 112-123, 126 Stat. 
365 (2012).  
 111.  Id. § 2(b)(2). Second homeowners whose property is destroyed or damaged by a 
hurricane will no longer be eligible for subsidized rates.    
 112.  Dennis P. Robinson, Regional Economic Impacts of the 2008 Cedar Rapids Flood 
(May 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cedar-rapids.org/city-news/ 
flood-recovery-progress/floodrecoveryplans/Documents/Regional%20Economic%20 
Development%20Report%205.17.10.pdf.  
 113.  Cedar Rapids River Corridor Redevelopment Plan, SASAKI ASSOCS., INC.,  
http://www.sasaki.com/project/131/cedar-rapids-river-corridor-redevelopment-plan/ (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2012).  
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this embrace has yet to fully play out on the ground.114 The 
assumption that flood damage could be satisfactorily controlled by a 
combination of structural defense and preventing the construction of 
vulnerable structures in floodplains proved too simplistic. This 
assumption has been replaced by the concept of integrated flood-risk 
management. The policy changes and the difficulties in implementing 
them are reflected in the responses to the two major flooding events 
in recent years. The first event was the 1993 Upper Mississippi Flood 
and the second was Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
During the summer of 1993, heavy rains fell on already-wet soil 
in the Upper Mississippi basin, causing twelve to sixteen billion 
dollars in damages.115 Rainfall amounts ranged from 200 to 350% of 
normal,116 and in some areas the floods exceeded 500-year-occurrence 
estimates.117 The damage was widespread, especially for farms and 
small river towns, but it extended to flooded basements in Chicago.118 
Large cities such as Kansas City and St. Louis escaped major 
flooding,119 but there were levee failures in both places.120 A federal 
task force led by Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway was formed 
to investigate the causes of the flood. 
 The resulting “Galloway Report” remains the most 
comprehensive examination of flood policy produced by the federal 
government, but its lessons have yet to be fully implemented.121 The 
Report endorsed Gilbert White’s call for comprehensive, federal 
flood management rather than the piecemeal, uncoordinated 
management strategy that existed then and continues to this day.122 It 
also endorsed the notion that flood management had to be done on a 
 
 114.  See generally JAMES M. WRIGHT, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, THE 
NATION’S RESPONSES TO FLOOD DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT  (Wendy L. Hessler 
ed., 2000), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/hist_fpm.pdf (providing a detailed account of 
the evolution of the program and other flood control management initiatives). 
 115.  INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., supra note 10,  at 18. 
     116.    Id. at 10. 
     117.    Id. at 9. 
     118.    Id. at 17. 
     119.    Id. at 6. 
     120.    Id. at 18. 
 121. For example, the 2012 extension of the National Flood Insurance Program illustrates 
that inability of Congress to craft a new flood management program. See supra notes 109–10 .  
 122.  INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., supra note 10, at 73 (quoting 
GILBERT WHITE ET AL., ACTION AGENDA FOR MANAGING THE NATION’S FLOOD PLAINS 4–5 
(1992)).  
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watershed basis.123 The Report is especially notable for its exploration 
of the role that undeveloped or restored riparian areas and wetlands 
could play in floodwater retention.124 
Hurricane Katrina was the worst flood disaster since the 1927 
Mississippi River Flood. The response to the disaster was paradoxical. 
Federal taxpayers have re-armored New Orleans but also recognized 
the limits of this strategy.125 Katrina’s storm surge damaged some 169 
of the 350 miles of floodwalls and levees around New Orleans.126 The 
United States Army Corps of Engineers and the National Research 
Council both evaluated what went wrong, and both reached two 
major conclusions. First, the system of levees and floodwalls in place 
was not an integrated, coordinated, and well-maintained system.127 
Second, flood protection strategy in at-risk areas such as New Orleans 
must be based on an integrated risk-based system that expressly 
rejects the expectation that complete structural protection against all 
hydrologic contingencies is possible.128 
III. THE FUTURE OF FLOOD POLICY 
There is a widespread consensus that risk-based adjustment will 
be the basis for future flood-protection strategy, and that such a 
strategy is a crucial element of the transition from unsustainable to 
sustainable urban development.129 White’s vision has been articulated 
by the policy forum that honors him: 
There is a stronger trend in 2050 toward higher-density 
development, clustering, in-filling of urban areas, and planning for 
green infrastructure. The full range of flooding events is taken into 
account in planning, including low-probability, high-consequence 
storms. Many no-build zones—such as deep coastal storm surge 
zones, deep riverine floodplains, and other high-hazard or 
 
 123.  Id. at 141. 
 124.  Id. at 66–67. 
 125.  Schwartz, supra note 9. 
 126.  CHRISTINE F. ANDERSEN ET AL., HURRICANE KATRINA EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL, 
AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: WHAT 
WENT WRONG AND WHY 25 (2007). 
 127.  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, BUILDING A STRONGER CORPS: A SNAPSHOT OF HOW 
THE CORPS IS APPLYING LESSONS FROM KATRINA 8 (2009). 
 128.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: 
ASSESSING PRE-KATRINA VULNERABILITY AND IMPROVING MITIGATION AND 
PREPAREDNESS 4–5 (2009). 
 129.  E.g., UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, PLANNING 
SUSTAINABLE CITIES: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2009, at 5 (2009).  
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environmentally sensitive areas—are in place, analogous to the 
floodways and coastal barrier resources system units of the 
twentieth century. These no-build areas are respected in order to 
sustain the natural benefits they provide to society, including high-
quality water, appropriate habitat for fish, wildlife, and flora; 
groundwater recharge; recreation; and open spaces, in addition to 
flood damage abatement. Some communities have been relocated 
in whole or in part.130 
The problem is that the United States has been unable to 
translate the consensus among experts into a coherent policy. The 
most striking aspect of United States flood policy is the growing gap 
between, on the one hand, the increasing sophistication of flood and 
hazard mapping and risk assessment and communication, and on the 
other, the failure to incorporate these developments into law and 
policy. We continue to rely on uncoordinated, structural defenses,131 
even as our understanding of the limits of that policy increases and we 
continue to encourage floodplain development. The last part of the 
article identifies three barriers to adopting a flood-control policy 
centered on risk-based adjustment to flood hazards. 
A. Lack of an Authoritative Vision 
The United States lacks a coherent flood-control strategy that is 
binding on the states. A vision alone cannot create a coherent flood-
management strategy, but it can provide a standard that all 
subordinate units of government must follow instead of the every-
area-for-itself approach that characterizes much of the current United 
States flood-control practice. The European Union (EU) has 
implemented such a strategy. In 2007, the EU adopted a Floods 
 
 130.  GILBERT F. WHITE NAT’L FLOOD POLICY FORUM, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 2050, 
at 13 (2007). 
 131.  For over twenty years, water planners have been urged to plan at the watershed level. 
The lesson is slowly being absorbed, but the broader scale often only comes about when 
downstream or upstream interests oppose a project. The Fargo, North Dakota-Moorhead, 
Minnesota metro area is a case in point. The area is subject to frequent and severe flooding 
from the Red River, which flows north into Canada. In cooperation with the Corps, the towns 
are developing a multi-stage $1.7 billion plan which includes a strategy to divert the River 
around the towns when the River reaches a flood stage. F-M AREA DIVERSION,  
http://www.fmdiversion.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). The original diversion has been 
modified to provide upstream storage facilities to hold back water after downstream cities 
complained that the diversion would shift the flood damage to them. Jonathan P. Scoll, Flood 
Control on the Red River as a Complex Environmental Decision System, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Winter 2012, at 24, 27  (2012) (providing a history of the project from the perspective of 
a lawyer representing downstream communities). 
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Directive,132 which integrates flood management into a previously 
existing Water Framework Directive. EU directives are binding on 
the member states.133 They describe general outcomes which must be 
achieved in the member states through a combination of management 
and new legislation.134 The Floods Directive requires that all member 
states develop river-basin management plans to correct a deficiency 
in the Water Framework Directive, which failed to include flood-risk 
minimization as a management objective.135 
The Flood Directive proceeds from the premise that floods 
cannot be totally prevented but that the major risks associated with 
floods can be managed.136 To this end, all member states must identify 
the portions of rivers within their boundaries with significant flood 
risks, and then prepare flood-hazard maps that display the following 
three flooding scenarios and the probable adverse consequences in 
each scenario:137  
(a) floods with a low probability, or extreme event 
scenarios; 
(b) floods with a medium probability (likely return period 
≥  100 years); 
(c) floods with a high probability, where appropriate.138 
The maps form the basis for risk-management plans, which 
shall take into account relevant aspects such as costs and benefits, 
flood extent and flood conveyance routes and areas which have the 
potential to retain flood water, such as natural floodplains, the 
environmental objectives of Article 4 of Directive 2000/60/EC [The 
 
 132.  Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Oct. 2007 
on the Assessment and Management of Flood Risks, 2007  (L 288) 27. 
 133.  E.g., Case C-147/07, Comm’n v. France, 2008 E.C.R. 1-0000 (finding that France failed 
to meet water quality objectives of the Water Framework Directive). 
 134.  See, e.g., Directive 2007/60/EC, supra note 132, at art. 4 (dictating that member states 
shall assess flood risks on river basins, produce flood risk maps, and develop flood risk 
management plans). CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Official J. of the European Union C83/47 Art. 288 (2010) (Treaty of 
Lisbon). See generally TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (7th ed. 2010).    
     135.    See Directive 2007/60/EC, supra note 132, at art. 7.  
 136.  Id. intro. (“Floods are natural phenomena which cannot be prevented. . . . It is feasible 
and desirable to reduce the risk of adverse consequences, especially for human health and life, 
the environment, cultural heritage, economic activity and infrastructure associated with 
floods.”). 
 137.  Id. arts. 4–6. 
     138.    Id. art. 6(3). 
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Water Framework Directive], soil and water management, spatial 
planning, land use, nature conservation, navigation and port 
infrastructure. 
  Flood risk management plans shall address all aspects of flood 
risk management focusing on prevention, protection, preparedness, 
including flood forecasts and early warning systems and taking into 
account the characteristics of the particular river basin or sub-basin. 
Flood risk management plans may also include the promotion of 
sustainable land use practices, improvement of water retention as 
well as the controlled flooding of certain areas in the case of a flood 
event.139 
EU Directives face many implementation problems, but they can 
lead to the development of new and useful science-based standards140 
and innovative national legislation.141 
B. No Coherent Disbursal of Federal Funds for Flood Control 
The federal government has mostly stopped building large dams 
but has not stopped the scattered distribution of funds. The federal 
government now funds flood-control structures, but in an irrational 
way. The construction of small dams, levees, and other defenses is 
now the product of two factors: congressional politics and the 
magnitude of a potential disaster. While this was always the case, the 
previous constraints on pure pork-barrel politics have been loosened. 
Congress can still open the federal treasury as it has done for New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina,142 but, in general, it is funding only 
small flood-control projects and often only those initiated by local 
communities. This makes it virtually impossible to follow the precept 
 
 139.  Id. art. 7(3).  
 140.  The Water Framework Directive requires that pollution management decisions be 
based on ecological effects rather than sole reliance on the standard parameters of pollution. 
This has led to innovative monitoring and ecological assessment systems. Daniel Hering et al., 
The European Water Framework Directive at the Age of 10: A Critical Review of the 
Achievements With Recommendations for the Future, 408 SCI. TOTAL  ENV’T. 4007, 4008 (2010). 
For a less sanguine conclusion, see Henrik Josefsson & Lasse Baaner, The Water Framework 
Directive—A Directive for the Twenty-First Century?, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 463 (2011). 
 141.  Scotland used the Floods Directive in 2009 to enact The Flood Risk Management Act, 
“which deliberately focuses attention on the extent to which the reduction of flood risk might be 
achieved through both structural and non-structural options . . . including the potential for 
‘natural features’ in the landscape to help retain flood water.” Chris Spray, Tom Ball & Josselin  
Rouillard, Bridging the Water Law, Policy, Science Interface: Flood Risk Management in 
Scotland, 20 WATER L. 165, 171–72 (2009). 
 142.  Over fifteen billion dollars have been spent to construct a new levee system. John 
Schwartz, New Orleans Levees Nearly Ready, But Mistrusted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/us/24levee.html?_r=1.  
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of the EU Floods Directives that floods must be managed at the river 
basin or watershed scale. The primary federal agency responsible for 
flood control, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, is not 
authorized to prioritize the allocation of federal funds.143 
In 1974, Congress abandoned the practice of large-scale, basin-
level project financing exemplified by the 1936 and 1944 Flood 
Control Acts in favor of episodic Water Resource Development Acts 
(WRDAs).144 WRDAs authorize all manner of water projects 
proposed by individual members of Congress and filtered through the 
House Committee on Transportation or the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works. The final legislation is an example of 
the politics of resource redistribution.145 This fragmentation was 
cemented in the 1986 WRDA, which imposed a variety of cost-
sharing formulas for new projects, accepting the post–New Deal 
argument that small projects were only of local importance.146 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has never had the 
independent authority to propose and build projects; rather, it must 
seek Congressional funding on a project-by-project basis. By contrast, 
through the 1960s, the Corps and Congress worked more closely to 
plan on larger scales than is the case today.147 Currently, WRDAs 
dilute and fragment the Corps’ authority to initiate projects, both 
within the Corps itself and between the Corps and Congress. They 
also create a strong institutional bias against both planning and 
constructing on a basin-wide scale and matching money to the 
magnitude of flood risk and project benefits.148 WRDAs have also 
 
 143.  NICOLE T. CARTER & H. STEVEN HUGHES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32064, 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS: AUTHORIZATION AND 
APPROPRIATIONS 6 (2006). 
 144.  The last WRDA was enacted in 2007. See Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-114, 121 Stat. 1041. The 2007 WRDA was enacted over President George W. 
Bush’s veto and authorizes over 900 Corps of Engineers projects. U.S. Resources Development 
Act of 2007,  HYDRO-LOGIC (Nov. 10, 2007),  http://hydro-logic.blogspot.com/2007/11/us-water-
resources-development-act-of.html. 
 145.  One of the leading students of water project funding characterizes Congressional 
funding as an example of the politics of the widespread geographical distribution of federal 
largesse. HELEN INGRAM, WATER POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 38–39 (1990).  
 146. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 103, 100 Stat. 
4082, 4084–85. 
 147.  See FERRELL, supra note 61, at 125 (describing the coordination between Congress, 
states, and the Corps beginning in the 1930s).  
 148.  CARTER & HUGHES, supra note 143, at 6.  
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decreased the power of the Corps to use benefit–cost analysis to weed 
out inefficient local projects. 
The inclusion of a project in a WRDA does not ensure its 
construction. It must also receive an appropriation. The 
appropriations process is shared between the Corps, the Executive 
(through the Office of Management and Budget), and Congress.149 
There is no benefit–cost screen for inclusion in a WRDA, but there is 
for appropriations.150 However, WRDAs can dribble planning funds 
to keep small projects alive. As the Congressional Research Service 
has observed, “the appropriated funds for an individual study or 
project . . . [may be] insufficient to permit the optimum programming 
of work by the Corps.”151 
The focus on small projects, often kept alive for years as 
individual representatives secure the authorization of small amounts 
of planning money, means that real problems continue to worsen. For 
example, many of the nation’s levees were not constructed to deal 
with the 100-year flood, let alone the increased frequency and 
magnitude of floods associated with climate change.152 In 2010, the 
Association of State Floodplain Managers issued the following 
warning concerning risks resulting from the deteriorating levees, 
climate change, and federal budget priorities: 
We will soon enter an era of levee ‘triage’—the process of 
prioritizing federal response to flood risk associated with levees and 
rationing scarce federal dollars on multiple-objective risk reduction 
projects that may include floodplain restoration, reconfiguration of 
structural systems, and combinations of systems that make the best 
use of resources.153 
C. The Chilling Effect of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence 
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence presents a major barrier to 
incorporating risk and moral-hazard considerations into land-use 
 
 149.  See NICOLE T. CARTER & CHARLES V. STERN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41243, 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS: AUTHORIZATION AND 
APPROPRIATIONS 6 (2011). 
 150.  Id. at 7. 
 151.  CARTER & HUGHES, supra note 143, at 6.  
 152.  For example, after an assessment of Dallas’ levees, the Corps withdrew its support for 
FEMA certification of “a 100 year event.” U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT: 100-YEAR FLOOD EVENT REMEDIATION MEASURES DALLAS FLOODWAY 
SYSTEM ES-2 (2011). 
 153.  ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, NATIONAL FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT—
LEVEE SAFETY COMPONENT 1 (2010).  
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decisions designed to limit floodplain development. Fairness is the 
core norm inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions against 
the taking of property without due process.154 Fairness has two 
dimensions: protecting landowners who are the victims of 
discrimination and avoiding surprise. Discrimination occurs when a 
single property owner (or a small group) is singled out to bear a 
disproportionate burden.155 The easiest takings cases are usually equal 
protection cases where the regulation comes too late to be effective. 
Unfairness also occurs when a landowner is justifiably surprised 
by a regulation. The Court incorporated the protection against 
surprise into takings law in the 1978 Penn Central case.156 Penn 
Central, which upheld a landmark designation, announced a balancing 
test that implicitly narrowed the situations in which surprise could be 
claimed by limiting compensation to cases where the government 
interferes with “reasonable,”157 “distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”158 
Flood-control regulation squarely raises the question of whether 
property owners who develop in a floodplain have any basis to claim 
they have been unfairly discriminated against or surprised. In general, 
the answer is no, although flood-control maps still underestimate risks 
and communities have resisted adjusting them to climate change.159 
Much building in floodplains, at least today, can be characterized as 
moral-hazard behavior. The problem is that the Court’s takings 
 
 154.  Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1245 (1967) (“We tend 
naturally to think of fairness as a standard against which to test political action, a discipline to be 
administered specifically and with deliberation, an extrinsic constraint to be imposed on an 
intrinsically nonfair political process.”).  
 155.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 156.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). The Supreme 
Court identified “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and, particularly, the 
extent to which the investment has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” are 
the major relevant factors in deciding whether compensation is due. Id. at 124. 
 157.  Justice Brennan was influenced by Professor Frank Michelman’s path-breaking article. 
See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128 (citing Michelman, supra note 154). Professor Michelman 
identified notice that a claimed property interest would not be recognized as a legitimate basis 
to deny compensation, and Justice Brennan cited a leading example. See id. at 125 (citing 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (holding the Federal 
government’s paramount interest in the use of navigable waters imposes a servitude on such 
waters and prevents the recognition of the private riparian against the federal government)). 
 158.  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).  
 159.  DAN HUBER, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, FIXING A BROKEN 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: RISKS AND POTENTIAL REFORMS 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/flood-insurance-brief.pdf. 
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jurisprudence creates incentives for property owners to engage in 
risky behavior.160 Thus, it performs the opposite of what the surprise 
component of fairness is designed to do: compensate victims of 
regulation who have suffered substantial and unanticipated losses in 
the value of their property, which are disproportionate in comparison 
to those suffered by similarly situated right holders.161 
Floodplain regulation has a long history, but takings law casts 
doubts on its ability to deal with the expected severity and 
geographical scope of floods. Early efforts to limit development in 
floodplains were initially questioned because the primary purpose 
was deemed paternalistic.162 Courts, however, upheld ordinances 
limiting development in floodplains.163 An influential Connecticut 
case involved a challenge to state Water Resources Commission 
setback restrictions along a river that had recently flooded.164 A 
riparian property owner whose buildings were destroyed by a flood 
and could only use sixty square feet to rebuild challenged the 
setbacks as a taking.165 The court held that the refusal to allow a new 
cinder-block building on a concrete foundation was a “justifiable” 
preventative measure in light of the loss of life and property caused 
by the flood.166 
Floodplain regulation has become harder to sustain under the 
Supreme Court’s post-1978 jurisprudence. Three major opinions 
involve flood-control regulations, and the Court found a potential 
 
 160.  The self-executing nature of the Fifth Amendment and the Court’s unwillingness to 
accept environmental justifications for land use regulations, discussed infra, creates a substantial 
incentive for land owners to challenge regulations as a taking. See Klien & Zellmer, supra note 
32, at 1510–18 (describing the phenomenon as a “double take” because taxpayers subsidize bad 
behavior through both paying for the construction of flood control structures and compensating 
land owners for regulatory takings when building in floodplain areas is prohibited). If 
communities allow risky behavior in flood plains, the government often subsidizes protection 
through levees and insurance. Id. at 1510. If communities try to prevent the behavior, 
“taxpayers may be forced to compensate disappointed developers.” Id.  
 161.  See Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think About Fairness, 50 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 455 (2010). 
 162.  Allison Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1107 
(1959).  
 163.  E.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); 
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Mass. 1972); Vartelas v. Water 
Res. Comm’n, 153 A.2d 822, 826 (Conn. 1959).  
 164.  Vartelas, 153 A.2d at 824–26.  
 165.  Id. at 823.  
 166.  Id. at 825–26 (noting that the plaintiff had failed to establish that an alternative 
structure “would serve the plaintiff’s purposes and permit the economic utilization of the 
property”).  
Tarlock 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  2:27 PM 
Fall 2012] U.S. FLOOD CONTROL POLICY 179 
taking in each. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles167 held that a church camp could claim a 
temporary taking when Los Angeles County prevented it from 
rebuilding after the camp was destroyed in a flash flood.168 The case 
established for the first time that a court may award damages for a 
taking in this context, but contained no discussion of the desirability 
of preventing the land owner from engaging in behavior that is a 
moral hazard.169 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council170 held that a 
state setback regulation on barrier islands, designed to prevent houses 
from crashing into each other in a hurricane, was a per se taking 
because it deprived the land owner of all economic value of his land.171 
South Carolina argued that the setback regulation was well within its 
police powers because the setbacks were designed to prevent a 
landowner from engaging in a harmful use, as opposed to 
unjustifiably and unfairly forcing her to confer a benefit on the 
community.172 The distinction has been urged as a useful test to decide 
when fairness demands compensation, but Justice Scalia dismissed 
the distinction on the ground that it was incoherent.173 For Justice 
Scalia, a regulation which denies a land owner all valuable 
development options could only be justified if there was an inherent 
limitation on the landowner’s title, and none was found in this case.174 
For all its questionable analysis, the much-parsed Lucas is a simple 
equal-protection case; the state applied a setback to a barrier island 
after development on all but plaintiff’s lots had occurred. 
The third Supreme Court case to ignore the merits of flood-
damage prevention involved a city’s approval of the expansion of 
development on a riparian property, on the condition that the owner 
dedicate a portion of the property in the floodplain for an improved 
storm drainage system.175 Development exactions are usually imposed 
 
 167.  482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
     168.    Id. at 307–08, 322.  
 169.  See id. at 322. The Church never recovered damages because a California appellate 
court held that the regulation was a valid health and safety regulation. First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).  
     170.    505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 171. Id. at 1007–09, 1028–32.  
 172. Id. at 1022–1024. 
 173. Id. at 1026.  
 174. Id. at 1027. 
 175. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–82 (1994). 
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to offset the external costs of a specific proposed development, 176 and 
the Supreme Court requires an “essential nexus” between the impact 
of the development and the exaction and “rough proportionality” 
between the exaction and the predicted consequence.177 The Court 
had no trouble finding a nexus between preventing flood damage and 
limiting development, but it imposed a very high burden on the city to 
justify the exaction:178 “The city has never said why a public greenway, 
as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood 
control.”179 The net result of these cases is that courts will still uphold 
floodplain regulations but are open to takings challenges.180 
As more is known about flood risk, one could argue that 
regulation can hardly come as a surprise to property owners. 
However, the Court has been reluctant to allow governments to 
provide notice to landowners through legislation that they should not 
engage in moral-hazard behavior. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island seemed 
to foreclose such legislative notice but nevertheless left a door open 
to such notice. In that case, Rhode Island defended its refusal to allow 
the landowner to fill a wetland on the grounds that forty years of 
wetland regulation had put landowners on notice that it would be 
difficult to obtain such permission.181 The Court dismissed the 
argument that the purchaser of highly-regulated property assumes the 
risk of development denial with the quip that “[t]he state may not put 
so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”182 Locke 
himself might be surprised that his labor theory now incorporates the 
Roman law right of ius abutendi—the right to destroy property.183 
However, Justice O’Connor’s increasingly influential concurrence 
opened the door to incorporating moral hazard into takings law. She 
posited that the level of regulation was relevant to the property 
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and thus the 
 
 176.  Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).  
 177.  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  
 178.  Id. at 386–87. 
 179.  Id. at 393. 
 180.  See, e.g., April v. City of Broken Arrow, 775 P.2d 1347, 1348, 1355–56 (Okla. 1989). 
 181.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614, 627 (2001). 
 182.  Id. at 627. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor argued that the property owner’s 
knowledge of the extent of regulation was an element to be considered in determining the 
compensation, if any, to which he was entitled under the interference with investment backed-
expectations standard. Id. at 634–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). On remand, the Rhode Island 
trial court found that proposed fill would be a public nuisance. J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance 
Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 776 (2008). 
 183.  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 787–89 (2005). 
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level of reasonable compensation.184 Justice O’Connor’s analysis has 
been adopted by the Federal Circuit in a variety of contexts to deny 
compensation.185 
The case that came closest to incorporating moral hazard into 
takings law is Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States.186 The 
District had a state water right to apply 2,800 acre-feet of water per 
year to beneficial use, but to comply with a National Marine Fisheries 
Biological Opinion (BiOp), the District was required to construct a 
fish ladder at the intersection of a dam and canal, and to divert 
between 1,349 and 3,200 acre-feet per year to supply the ladder.187 
Reversing a lower court decision denying compensation, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regulation was a physical 
taking and remanded for a calculation of damages.188 
On remand, the District invoked projected decreases in water 
supply from climate change as a reason that the loss of water was a 
taking.189 However, after a trial, the Court of Federal Claims found 
that no damages had occurred and thus did not reach the District’s 
climate change argument.190 The District argued that the biological 
opinion had caused a permanent loss of 1,915 acre-feet, measured by 
the annual reduction of the project’s safe yield.191 The court rejected 
that damage measure because the measure of any water right is 
beneficial use.192 Applying this standard, the court found that storage 
 
 184.  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Compare Justice 
O’Connor’s analysis with her plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 
(1998), in which she concluded that retroactive coal miner health care liability interfered with 
investment-backed expectations of a company that went out of business.   
 185.  See, e.g., Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States, 561 F.3d 1361, 1365–71 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 2402 (2010) (refusing compensation for designation of tidal 
lands on Palmyra Atol as wildlife refuge closed to commercial fishing); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. 
United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying compensable taking in 
designation of lands under Surface Mine Reclamation Act as unsuitable for coal mining); Rith 
Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1353–53 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (disavowing 
compensation for revocation of mining permit).  
 186. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For an analysis of the decision see A. Dan Tarlock, 
Takings, Water Rights, and Climate Change, 36 VERMONT L. REV. 731, 753–56 (2012). 
 187. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1282.  
 188. Id. at 1296.   
 189. Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief, Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443 
(2011) (No. 05-168L), ECF No. 213, asserts that the District has no surplus water and climate 
change will aggravate its thin margin of safety. The assertion is based on the Expert Report of 
Edward Aguado, Department of Geography, San Diego State University. Id. 
 190.  Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 472. 
 191.  Id. at 465. 
 192.  Id. at 470. 
Tarlock 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  2:27 PM 
182 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:151 
allowed the District both to meet its delivery obligations and to 
comply with the bypass requirements of the BiOp.193 Thus, the 
District’s takings claim was not ripe because it had not suffered “an 
actual reduction in beneficial use.”194 The court’s reaffirmation that a 
water right is limited to water actually applied to beneficial use is an 
important step in the incorporation of risk and moral hazard into 
takings law. In explaining why there had not been an interference 
with beneficial use, the court observed that the District continued to 
add customers but, “ha[d] not changed how it allocates water to its 
customers, has not purchased alternative water supplies, has not 
instituted any mandatory conservation measures or changed its 
drought contingency measures, and has not increased the price of 
water due to the biological opinion.”195 
The facts of Casitas do not present a classic moral-hazard 
problem. There was a forty-year lag between the time that the 
District signed a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation to obtain 
water from the Ventura River Project and the time that it was asked 
to construct a fish ladder to protect listed endangered species.196 
Nonetheless, the court explicitly suggested that the beneficial-use 
doctrine may require a water-right holder to take affirmative steps to 
avoid a loss caused by the need to adapt to changed conditions—an 
implicit moral-hazard analysis.197 It sanctioned the water-right holder 
for engaging in moral-hazard behavior by failing to take action that 
would have avoided the loss. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a firm consensus among students of flood control policy 
that the future of flood-management policies must adopt risk-
management strategies that mix structural protections with more 
aggressive land-use and building regulations. There are a great deal of 
innovative flood protection and management initiatives taking place 
around the United States, and technological advances in hazard 
mapping now allow risk managers to display climate range risks at 
fine scales. However, it will not be easy to translate this consensus 
into policy on the ground. Three reasons stand out. First, flood 
 
 193.  Id. at 461–62. 
 194.  Id. at 474. 
 195.  Id. at 470. 
 196.  Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 197.  Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 454.  
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control is slowly being devolved to local and regional bodies. The lack 
of federal money and guidance means that the potential for 
communities to shift flood risks to upstream or downstream 
communities remains high. Second, too often the Federal Flood 
Insurance Program, and the land-use regulations enacted to comply 
with it, function to allow too much development in at-risk areas.198 
Third, the seemingly deep and entrenched denial of climate change in 
the United States199 makes it very difficult for many areas to adjust 
flood maps to incorporate realistic climate change scenarios, as they 
must. Thus, in contrast to Europe, the United States has de facto 
adopted a reactive flood control policy, pursuant to which we are 
likely to wait for flood disasters and then construct new protection 
structures while along the way engaging in modest attempts at natural 
flood retardation and floodplain retreat. Time will tell if this strategy 
will be adequate to deal with a changing climate and a growing 
population that loves to be near water.200 
 
 
 198.  “Even without climate change, these [FEMA-required] maps create incentives to 
locate in areas of high risk, because flood insurance is only required within areas with at least a 
one percent chance of serious flooding in any given year.” ELLEN HANAK & JAY LUND, 
ADAPTING CALIFORNIA’S WATER MANAGEMENT TO CLIMATE CHANGE 22–23 (2008), 
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_1108jlr.pdf. 
 199. It is difficult to measure climate change attitudes. A 2012 University of Texas poll 
taken during the 2012 drought in the center of the country found that 70% of persons surveyed 
believe that climate change is occurring. Dorsi Diaz, 70 Percent of People in U.S. Now Believe in 
Climate Change, EXAMINER (July 20, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/70-percent-of-
people-u-s-now-believe-climate-change. However, a poll of Iowa farmers found that while 68% 
percent of those surveyed believe that climate change is occurring, only 10% of the 68% 
attribute it to human causes. Gregory Meyer, Climate Skepticism Drenches Drought-Hit US 
Corn Belt, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at 3.  
 200.  The current United States population is 313 million and projections vary from 323 to 
458 million as the Bureau of Census explains. “The U.S. population is projected to increase over 
the next four decades in all of the projection series. The size of the increase in each series is 
dependent on the level of net international migration.” JENNIFER M. ORTMAN & CHRISTINE E. 
GUARNERI, UNITED STATES POPULATION PROJECTIONS: 2000 TO 2050, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/analytical-document09.pdf. 
